The Falklands are a great case study of ‘you don’t have to be the best, just better than the other guy’.
Because there was a couple of really major opportunities that could have legitimately won the war for Argentina if they zigged instead of zagged.
The one that comes to my mind is during the San Carlos landings the Argentine aircraft chose to attack the major surface vessels and left the landing craft completely unmolested.
If they had made runs on the mostly undefended soldiers rather than the big ships, or at least split between them then they would have dealt another significant blow to a force that was already pretty on the brink after the loss of the Atlantic Conveyor and the desperately valuable supplies and resources on it.
The British commanders had also made some pretty significant strategic blunders as well, such as placing the Type 42 Destroyers as the fleet med-high AD and early radar picket despite well knowing and being fearful of the Exocet missiles in the Argentine inventory. The Exocet was a surface skimming system which the defensive and detection systems on the Type 42s were unable to do anything about. After the sinking of the Sheffield the picket was made up of a Type 42 and 82 as they complimented each other to provide a wider AD capability.
The Falklands are a great case study of ‘you don’t have to be the best, just better than the other guy’.
Because there was a couple of really major opportunities that could have legitimately won the war for Argentina if they zigged instead of zagged.
The one that comes to my mind is during the San Carlos landings the Argentine aircraft chose to attack the major surface vessels and left the landing craft completely unmolested. If they had made runs on the mostly undefended soldiers rather than the big ships, or at least split between them then they would have dealt another significant blow to a force that was already pretty on the brink after the loss of the Atlantic Conveyor and the desperately valuable supplies and resources on it.
The British commanders had also made some pretty significant strategic blunders as well, such as placing the Type 42 Destroyers as the fleet med-high AD and early radar picket despite well knowing and being fearful of the Exocet missiles in the Argentine inventory. The Exocet was a surface skimming system which the defensive and detection systems on the Type 42s were unable to do anything about. After the sinking of the Sheffield the picket was made up of a Type 42 and 82 as they complimented each other to provide a wider AD capability.