In March, the configuration for building openSUSE Factory was changed to be bit-by-bit reproducible (except for the embedded signature). Following this, the ...
As much as I love openSUSE, and reproducible builds are a core requirement for trusted computing…
reproducible builds were reported as being useful
Really buries the lede of the xz attack results
either both are trojaned, or none
Edit: It is very useful for the first half - to ensure new packages extracted by a compromised xz weren’t modified during the extraction.
It’s just that reproducing the build of the tampered xz would still produce a bit-for-bit identical compromised version due to the way it modified the build system
As much as I love openSUSE, and reproducible builds are a core requirement for trusted computing…
Really buries the lede of the xz attack results
Edit: It is very useful for the first half - to ensure new packages extracted by a compromised xz weren’t modified during the extraction.
It’s just that reproducing the build of the tampered xz would still produce a bit-for-bit identical compromised version due to the way it modified the build system