UPDATE: The latest RC version of Lemmy-ui (0.18.2-rc.2) contains fixes for the issue, but if you believe you were vulnerable, you should still rotate your JWT secret after upgrading! Read below for instructions. Removing custom emoji is no longer necessary after upgrading.

Original post follows:

This post is intended as a central place that admins can reference regarding the XSS incident from this morning.

What happened?

A couple of the bigger Lemmy instances had several user accounts compromised through stolen authentication cookies. Some of these cookies belonged to admins, these admin cookies were used to deface instances. Only users that opened pages with malicious content during the incident were vulnerable. The malicious content was possible due to a bug with rendering custom emojis.

Stolen cookies gave attackers access to all private messages and e-mail addresses of affected users.

Am I vulnerable?

If your instance has ANY custom emojis, you are vulnerable. Note that it appears only local custom emojis are affected, so federated content with custom emojis from other instances should be safe.

I had custom emojis on my instance, what should I do?

This should be enough to mitigate now:

  1. Remove custom emoji
DELETE FROM custom_emoji_keyword;
DELETE FROM custom_emoji;
  1. Rotate your JWT secret (invalidates all current login sessions)
-- back up your secret first, just in case
SELECT * FROM secret;
-- generate a new secret
UPDATE secret SET jwt_secret = gen_random_uuid();
  1. Restart Lemmy server

If you need help with any of this, you can reach out to me on Matrix (@sunaurus:matrix.org) or on Discord (@sunaurus)

Legal

If your instance was affected, you may have some legal obligations. Please check this comment for more info: https://lemmy.world/comment/1064402

More context:

https://github.com/LemmyNet/lemmy-ui/issues/1895

https://github.com/LemmyNet/lemmy-ui/pull/1897

    • Arthur BesseEnglish
      1•1 year ago

      I get your point. But it’s a huge risk.

      Using a separate account doesn’t substantially mitigate the risk. It might reduce the chances of getting randomly exploited, but it’s easy to post things admins need to see to do their job so any attacker wanting to target admins would still be able to even if we used separate accounts.

      Systemically fixing the XSS problems is necessary either way :)

      edit: actually I guess most common admin activities could be separated from the rarely used ones, at least… or the infrequent actions could simply require re-authenticating. That wouldn’t be a bad idea.