• TimLovesTech (AuDHD)(he/him)
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    26 months ago

    Roberts did not list the military as one of the “official acts” that would be immune, because Trump doesn’t need the military yet to stay out of jail. The list was a blue print to keeping Trump out of jail should he win the election. The military would however likely fall under what the majority of the SCOTUS would call an action that would have “presumed immunity”, but they really left that up to the SCOTUS to decide on a case by case basis (aka does it help Trump or one of the Justice’s “friends”).

    • @chaogomu
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      26 months ago

      Commanding the military is one of the examples Roberts gave as an always Official act that comes with complete immunity. It was talked about very briefly in the decision, and expanded upon in the dissents because the dissents pointed out that using seal team 6 to kill Americans is now completely legal.

      • TimLovesTech (AuDHD)(he/him)
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        16 months ago

        I did find the part that listed the military as one of the Presidents office acts, you are correct on that. I also found this on page 62, that is the basis for the questioning about Seal Team 6 during arguments, and again in the SCOTUS descent. I read it as effectively saying that if the President uses police or military to do an “unlawful killing” then because they are “exempt” he would be immune. So the President isn’t allowed to murder in a foreign country, but if he uses the military it’s an official act and exempt? This reads to me like it only stops the President from personally being a Rambo, carrying out hit jobs, but Trump was a draft dodger (so …). Any lawyers here? I don’t see an instance of the President carrying out an “unlawful” killing without using the police or military. Except if maybe this is one of those things left over from when a President would duel, or people in Congress would bludgeon someone with a cane?

        Congress has concurrent authority over many Government functions, and it may sometimes use that authority to regulate the President’s official conduct, including by criminal statute. Article II poses no barrier to prosecution in such cases.

        I would thus assess the validity of criminal charges predicated on most official acts—i.e., those falling outside of the President’s core executive power—in two steps. The first question is whether the relevant criminal statute reaches the President’s official conduct. Not every broadly worded statute does. For example, §956 covers conspiracy to murder in a foreign country and does not expressly exclude the President’s decision to, say, order a hostage rescue mission abroad. 18 U. S. C. §956(a). **The underlying murder statute, however, covers only “unlawful” killings. §1111. The Office of Legal Counsel has interpreted that phrase to reflect a public-authority exception for official acts involving the military and law enforcement. **