So, the 80 million nonvoters in 2020 voted for Biden? I voted for Biden and Harris. That does not imply my consent for genocide. Complicity is only maintained through inaction. When I denounce the genocidal action, my complicity ends.
Since we’re erroneously referencing logic thought experiments, the trolley problem refutes the prisoner’s dilemma.
The thing about the dilemma is that you need to realize that the prisoners are rational, feeling people. They have good reasons to do what they do, often enough. Often their goals are good ones, compassionate ones.
They aren’t trying to scheme or sabotage one another. But they wind up doing that, because the only success condition is mutual cooperation.
That didn’t happen for us, and the outcome is boolean, pass or fail. Any move except sticking to the coalition and acting to cooperate would have doomed the effort completely, and we didn’t do that. So, here we are.
Where in the Wikipedia article does it mention “voting for the lesser evil “ is an archetype for the prisoner’s dilemma? I’m willing to change my mind, but I need actual reasons to do so.
It’s a varying application. It usually models opposing groups during diplomatic tensions, but it can also apply to groups within coalitions who face the same problem together but disagree how the coalition should proceed.
In the process of applying things, you have to consider the outcomes and think of the prisoners as “trapped” by the circumstances of the decision they face. Trapped here means that inaction triggers consequences, so it explicitly models inaction as a choice facing the circumstance.
Usually during negotiation that follows this kind of pattern, the prisoner’s dilemma is applied to figure out the best way to articulate the circumstances at hand and the choices everyone has. It’s a way to connect the cause and effect of everything to everyone in the negotiation, and to illustrate how their actions flow into those consequences, in a way that frames everything as less a “you vs me”, and more of an “us vs the problem”.
And that’s where the logic part comes into play: here it works as a mechanic to introduce cause and effect group logic to humans, and connect the notion of it all to their emotional needs. It helps demonstrate that negotiation and compromise are hard but valuable, logically and emotionally.
If you haven’t read it, “Getting to Yes” is fantastic. I highly recommend it, and although it doesn’t speak about the dilemma directly, the entire thing is about navigating compromise tactically in situations where everyone may be very correct, yet still have a hard time with each other.
This is why I don’t think the dilemma is comparable:
However, in real life this is rarely how people judge how to cast their votes. Generally, Democrat and Republican voters are afraid to break rank because if the voters of one party vote 3rd party, and the voters in another part stick to party lines, this means that voters who voted 3rd party will end up with the short end of the stick. This incentivizes voters to stick to party lines and vote for candidates who are “good enough” (which represents the worst option of the prisoners dilemma in which both of the prisoners confess), reaffirming the two party system and preventing the possibility of more viable 3rd parties which can represent the views of the people better. source
Taking a thought experiment and scaling it for millions of voters is a fool’s errand. We’re dealing with social dynamics and fluid variables. I can agree that on an individual basis, or a small group, it could be a helpful tool. But, with large numbers it ceases to be viable. It fails to account for irrational prisoners that both confess, leading to the worst outcomes.
I can see where you’re coming from on the whole matter of scale, yeah. It does broaden the subject’s surface area a lot, and there’s no way to really say you have a control group at that point. So, I think you’re right that the variables in a national coalition are possibly too blurry for a direct mapping. Maybe?
I guess I’d say that I can still see the mapping holding, but I suppose it’s just in an aspirational sense. The puzzle’s framing does hold pretty well for coalition negotiation w/ representation, and so it seems to me like that’s a big thing missing here and that’s a big point in your favor.
I think, given cohesive, known/defined members in a coalition, even if they’re rough models, you get some utility out of the dilemma.
But, I don’t think we have that kind of self-aware cohesion, do we?
I think in any case it kind of feels like, to me, your point is just illustrating how badly the folks in charge botched stuff. It’s exhausting, honestly. It’s always been very nebulous who we are and what we’re striving to do, but right now we don’t even have those rough models to understand our own coalition. No wonder we can’t get anything done.
So, the 80 million nonvoters in 2020 voted for Biden? I voted for Biden and Harris. That does not imply my consent for genocide. Complicity is only maintained through inaction. When I denounce the genocidal action, my complicity ends.
Since we’re erroneously referencing logic thought experiments, the trolley problem refutes the prisoner’s dilemma.
The thing about the dilemma is that you need to realize that the prisoners are rational, feeling people. They have good reasons to do what they do, often enough. Often their goals are good ones, compassionate ones.
They aren’t trying to scheme or sabotage one another. But they wind up doing that, because the only success condition is mutual cooperation.
That didn’t happen for us, and the outcome is boolean, pass or fail. Any move except sticking to the coalition and acting to cooperate would have doomed the effort completely, and we didn’t do that. So, here we are.
Where in the Wikipedia article does it mention “voting for the lesser evil “ is an archetype for the prisoner’s dilemma? I’m willing to change my mind, but I need actual reasons to do so.
A better understanding about the logic of voting:
It’s a varying application. It usually models opposing groups during diplomatic tensions, but it can also apply to groups within coalitions who face the same problem together but disagree how the coalition should proceed.
In the process of applying things, you have to consider the outcomes and think of the prisoners as “trapped” by the circumstances of the decision they face. Trapped here means that inaction triggers consequences, so it explicitly models inaction as a choice facing the circumstance.
Usually during negotiation that follows this kind of pattern, the prisoner’s dilemma is applied to figure out the best way to articulate the circumstances at hand and the choices everyone has. It’s a way to connect the cause and effect of everything to everyone in the negotiation, and to illustrate how their actions flow into those consequences, in a way that frames everything as less a “you vs me”, and more of an “us vs the problem”.
And that’s where the logic part comes into play: here it works as a mechanic to introduce cause and effect group logic to humans, and connect the notion of it all to their emotional needs. It helps demonstrate that negotiation and compromise are hard but valuable, logically and emotionally.
If you haven’t read it, “Getting to Yes” is fantastic. I highly recommend it, and although it doesn’t speak about the dilemma directly, the entire thing is about navigating compromise tactically in situations where everyone may be very correct, yet still have a hard time with each other.
This is why I don’t think the dilemma is comparable:
Taking a thought experiment and scaling it for millions of voters is a fool’s errand. We’re dealing with social dynamics and fluid variables. I can agree that on an individual basis, or a small group, it could be a helpful tool. But, with large numbers it ceases to be viable. It fails to account for irrational prisoners that both confess, leading to the worst outcomes.
I can see where you’re coming from on the whole matter of scale, yeah. It does broaden the subject’s surface area a lot, and there’s no way to really say you have a control group at that point. So, I think you’re right that the variables in a national coalition are possibly too blurry for a direct mapping. Maybe?
I guess I’d say that I can still see the mapping holding, but I suppose it’s just in an aspirational sense. The puzzle’s framing does hold pretty well for coalition negotiation w/ representation, and so it seems to me like that’s a big thing missing here and that’s a big point in your favor.
I think, given cohesive, known/defined members in a coalition, even if they’re rough models, you get some utility out of the dilemma.
But, I don’t think we have that kind of self-aware cohesion, do we?
I think in any case it kind of feels like, to me, your point is just illustrating how badly the folks in charge botched stuff. It’s exhausting, honestly. It’s always been very nebulous who we are and what we’re striving to do, but right now we don’t even have those rough models to understand our own coalition. No wonder we can’t get anything done.