1. You should generally be skeptical of news that comes by way of image macros. They often omit important information or distort facts.

2. You know you can read the decision judges issue, they are public records. In the case of high profile cases, they are often quite easy to obtain. Here is Chutkan’s decision about the TRO

3. Chutkan’s analysis seems reasonable to me. It seems like she applied the law correctly.

TROs are orders that can be issued prior to or during litigate to preserve the status quo. They are used to keep something irreversible and harmful from happening. They are not a final ruling, they are a stop gap to prevent harm. The T in TRO does not stand for Permanent. By their very nature, TROs can be issued without informing the opposing party to a case, and may not provide the opposing party a chance to respond to them before the order goes into effect. TROs not granted in the federal court system unless there are specific facts showing irreparable injure, loss or damage. In fact, Federal Courts treat them as extraordinary actions because they can be used to circumvent due process. In general, Federal courts issue preliminary injunctions, rather than TROs, to preserve the status quo. That is because preliminary injunctions provide opportunity for both parties of a dispute to argue for or against the injunction and are, unlike TROs- appealable. In effect, they give both parties the due process rights that are the backbone of the American justice system.

In this particular case a group of 14 US states are challenging Musk and his fake department, arguing that Musk’s position violates the appointment clause of the constitution, because he was not nominated by the president and confirmed by the Senate. The plaintiffs wanted a TRO that would prevent Musk from doing the following:

(a) Accessing or continuing to access any data systems and the information and code contained within those systems, including but not limited to systems containing sensitive or confidential agency and personnel data, at the Office of Personnel Management, the Department of Education, the Department of Labor, the Department of Health and Human Services, the Department of Energy, the Department of Transportation, and the Department of Commerce, or any components of any of those agencies, or copying, transferring, or in any way disseminating any data from any of the agencies identified in this paragraph; and

(b) Terminating, furloughing, or otherwise placing on involuntary leave—whether paid or unpaid—any officers or employees of the federal government working within any of the Departments and agencies identified in paragraph (a), other than officers or employees of the Defendant entities, or directing any federal department or agency, not including the Defendant entities, to take the prohibited actions described in this paragraph

To grant a TRO, plaintiffs would need to show immediate irreparable injury, that is, they would have to show how in the absence of the TRO they would suffer harms that the court would be unable to correct if they won their case. Critically, the standard for a TRO is that the party must show evidence of actual irreparable injury, not simply the possibility of harm. Here is Chutkan quoting the legal standard:

To show irreparable harm, the “injury alleged must be ‘both certain and great, actual and not theoretical, beyond remediation, and of such imminence that there is a clear and present need for equitable relief.’” Church v. Biden, 573 F. Supp. 3d 118, 138 (D.D.C. 2021) (quoting Mexichem Specialty Resins, Inc. v. EPA, 787 F.3d 544, 555 (D.C. Cir. 2015)). The “‘possibility of irreparable harm’ is not enough.” Id.

Chutkan ruled that, the plaintiffs in the case failed to show immediate irreparable injury, noting that most of their attestations of harm were hypothetical:

Plaintiffs’ declarations are replete with attestations that if Musk and DOGE Defendants cancel, pause, or significantly reduce federal funding or eliminate federal-state contracts, Plaintiff States will suffer extreme financial and programmatic harm

[. . .]

The court is aware that DOGE’s unpredictable actions have resulted in considerable uncertainty and confusion for Plaintiffs and many of their agencies and residents. See, e.g., Decl. of Ben Henderson ¶ 11, ECF No. 6-7; Decl. of Kimberly Bush-Koleszar ¶¶ 4-6, ECF No. 6-9. But the “possibility” that Defendants may take actions that irreparably harm Plaintiffs “is not enough.” See Church, 573 F. Supp. 3d at 138 (citation omitted); Beattie, 663 F. Supp. 2d at 9 (“[F]eared possibilities fall short of the imminent threat of injury required to grant a TRO.”). It remains “uncertain” when and how the catalog of state programs that Plaintiffs identify will suffer.

Chutkan goes on to point out that the plaintiff’s case is actually quite strong, perhaps signalling that a temporary injunction is in the near future, it is just that the did not meet the standards for a TRO:

That said, Plaintiffs raise a colorable Appointments Clause claim with serious implications. Musk has not been nominated by the President nor confirmed by the U.S. Senate, as constitutionally required for officers who exercise “significant authority pursuant to the laws of the United States.” [. . .] Bypassing this “significant structural safeguard of the constitutional scheme” [. . .] Musk has rapidly taken steps to fundamentally reshape the Executive Branch [. . .] Even Defendants concede there is no apparent “source of legal authority granting [DOGE] the power” to take some of the actions challenged here. [. . .] Accepting Plaintiffs’ allegations as true, Defendants’ actions are thus precisely the “Executive abuses” that the Appointments [. . .] But even a strong merits argument cannot secure a temporary restraining order at this juncture.

This seems like the correct decision to me given the plaintiff’s argument.