• @FourPacketsOfPeanuts
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    21 year ago

    Sort of begs the question by assuming there should be one “real you”. Why is this a restriction? Why not two real yous?

    You an hour from now is every bit you as the you that exists 2 hours from now. They’re not identical, but both exist, same space just at different points in time. So why not two “yous”, not identical, at the same time just at different points in space?

    • @[email protected]
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      fedilink
      11 year ago

      Because there being two real yous doesn’t make sense. Like you can have two identical things but they can not be the same thing, there must be a you #1 and a you #2. Like if I have two water bottles, they are two identical things but they are not the same thing. Changing one of them does not affect the other, thus they are not the same thing.

      • @FourPacketsOfPeanuts
        link
        21 year ago

        I’m not saying they’re identical, I’m saying they’re both “you”. That’s different.

        There are many "you"s already. Consider “you” at different points in time. You recognise it’s all the same individual, but they are not identical.

        Hence my last sentence. We’re comfortable with a variety of non-identical "you"s separated by time. So why not a variety of non-identical "you"s at same time, only separated by space.

        Our definition of identity is not tight because it doesn’t have to deal with situations like these. We having a working definition something like “the continuous experience of memories, personality and sensation in a body” that serves to help us identify the “you” from yesterday as the same person as the “you” now. They’re not identical. What they have in common is a shared continuous physicality.

        But if some sci-fi type cloning were possible where two "you"s step out from the one, then both could claim to have a shared continuous physical continuity with the “you” now. And as such both have the same and equal claim on who is the “real” one. As because of that why can’t they both be you? Both with separate ongoing experiences. But both “you” in every bit the same way as you claim to be the same “you” as yesterday.