TPM’s not going to help with that situation, though, right?
Either you’re typing in your encryption password on boot (in which case you don’t need TPM to keep your password), or you’re not, in which case the thief has your TPM module with the password in it.
From what I understand, TPM is “trusted” because of the fact the secrets it contains are supposed to be safe from an attacker with hardware access.
This is what makes it good at protecting data in case of a stolen laptop. This is also what makes it good at enforcing offline DRM or any kind of system where manufacturers can restrict the kind of software users can run on their hardware.
TPM’s not going to help with that situation, though, right? Either you’re typing in your encryption password on boot (in which case you don’t need TPM to keep your password), or you’re not, in which case the thief has your TPM module with the password in it.
From what I understand, TPM is “trusted” because of the fact the secrets it contains are supposed to be safe from an attacker with hardware access.
This is what makes it good at protecting data in case of a stolen laptop. This is also what makes it good at enforcing offline DRM or any kind of system where manufacturers can restrict the kind of software users can run on their hardware.