Ants improve the reproduction of inferior morphs to maintain a polymorphism in symbiont aphids - Scientific Reports
www.nature.com
Identifying stable polymorphisms is essential for understanding biodiversity. Distinctive polymorphisms are rare in nature because a superior morph should dominate a population. In addition to the three known mechanisms for polymorphism persistence, we recently reported a fourth mechanism: protection of the polymorphism by symbionts. Attending ants preferentially protect polymorphic aphid colonies consisting of green and red morphs. Here, we show that attending ants manipulate the reproductive rate of their preferred green morphs to equal that of the red morphs, leading to the persistence of the polymorphism within the colonies. We could not, however, explain how the ants maintained the polymorphism in aphid colonies regardless of inter-morph competition. Manipulation by symbionts may be important for the maintenance of polymorphisms and the resulting biodiversity in certain symbiotic systems.

From the article:

Ant-attended aphids are known to excrete high-quality honeydew when ants are present. Ant attendance has a negative effect on the growth and reproduction of the attended aphids. Therefore, trade-offs should occur between the quality of honeydew and the growth and fecundity of aphid individuals. Thus, if attending ants prefer the morph excreting a high-quality honeydew, such trade-offs and resulting competitive interactions are expected between the color morphs in M. yomogicola. The morph excreting high-quality honeydew is known to have a lower reproductive rate than the other morphs[9,10]. This fact implies that if the attending ants prefer one morph, this morph is expected to excrete high-quality honeydew. Note that any such difference between morphs leads to the exclusion of the inferior morphs. Surprisingly, nearly all colonies consist of both green and red morphs in the field.

      • @[email protected]English
        8•1 year ago

        Literally in the abstract

        In this paper, we do not challenge this claim. Instead, we presuppose its plausibility in order to explore what ethical consequences follow from it.

        And further in the introduction

        He has argued that, while animals probably lack the sorts of concepts and metacognitive capacities necessary to be held morally responsible for their behaviour, this only excludes them from the possibility of counting as moral agents. There are, however, certain moral motivations that, in his view, may be reasonably thought to fall within the reach of (at least some) animal species, namely, moral emotions such as “sympathy and compassion, kindness, tolerance, and patience, and also their negative counterparts such as anger, indignation, malice, and spite”, as well as “a sense of what is fair and what is not” (Rowlands 2012, 32). If animals do indeed behave on the basis of moral emotions, they should, he argues, be considered moral subjects, even if their lack of sophisticated cognitive capacities prevents us from holding them morally responsible.1

        But yes, I am fairly certain that no non-human animals has the mental facilities to be true moral agents. Especially because this is something a significant chunk of humans struggle with, and no animal comes close to us in terms of abstract thinking and that kinda stuff.

        • @eatthecakeEnglish
          -1•1 year ago

          I see animals acting in moral ways and that is interesting and should, in my opinion, be more widely known. Maybe ypu don’t need abstract thinking to have a sense of justice or sympathy or patience? Why do you place humans so far beyond animals when we are also animals?

          • @[email protected]English
            3•1 year ago

            Can an animal understand the moral implications of the exploitative logistics chain of creating a smartphone and your part in it as a consumer? And what alternatives could be used in its stead? From environmental, to exploitative of the workers, to the health issues of resource extraction or factory work. Or about the ethics and consequences of fast fashion, or political policies or phenomena such as universal healthcare or gentrification?

            If you are incapable of understanding the structural reason for why someone does something, I think it’s fair to say you cannot be a moral agents. Stealing is bad, yes, but is stealing bread because your children are starving bad? Is stealing still bad when the laws and moral framework that is set in the society determined by those who get rich off of exploiting the same people who steal? I think it’s fair to say you need a lot of abstract thinking to fully comprehend these scenarios.

            • @eatthecakeEnglish
              -3•1 year ago

              So industry, agriculture, modern tech, oil use, anything that harms the environment is non vegan, yes? That makes perfect sense.

              • @[email protected]English
                1•1 year ago

                I get you are being intentionally obtuse for some fucking reason, probably to absolve yourself of your own moral harm you are causing, but yeah, veganism is about reducing harm as much as individually possible. Is it really that hard to understand?

                • @DkarmaEnglish
                  -1•1 year ago

                  Because your logic is twisted and makes no sense. Maybe reevaluate your conclusions based on fallacies and anthropomorphized creatures.

    • @DkarmaEnglish
      -5•1 year ago

      They don’t have agency. Which means it’s fine to eat them. Thanks for confirming.

    • @DkarmaEnglish
      -5•1 year ago

      They don’t have agency. Which means it’s fine to eat them. Thanks for confirming.

        • @[email protected]English
          1•1 year ago

          while both are constructs, i only regard the construct of moral agency as valid. moral subjects/patients muddy the waters too much.

        • @DkarmaEnglish
          0•1 year ago

          I never said moral. I said agency. Morality is a human construct and irrelevant to the discussion.