I will acknowledge that when I describe the Israeli system as Apartheid, I’m using it in a colloquial sense, not a legal sense. Which I think is appropriate, because my purpose is to characterize the severity and urgency of the situation rather than prosecute the case in international court. But I can accept that it might fall short based on legal definitions (in part because Israel is familiar enough with international law that they usually take care in developing policy to try to avoid when possible making their violations easy to prosecute).
It’s a bit long, but the feature I think is useful is summed up here:
“If the Holocaust is the paradigmatic case for the crime of genocide and South Africa for that of apartheid, then the crime against the Palestinian people must be called the Nakba.”
The thesis, at least in my understanding, is that the situation is unique enough to fit poorly into the major categories we use for describing atrocities, and that it requires that we recognize it as the primary case for a novel form of ethnic oppression that incorporates elements of genocide and apartheid, but operates in a way that is ultimately unique to the specifics of this situation. I’m curious what you might think of that argument.
Honestly, I have a bone to pick with legal language.
I think it puts the cart before the horse. Law as a concept is an incredible invention, but I think we in our present often forget that it IS an invention: it’s a technology that was developed to systematize our ability to limit and remedy harm.
However we frequently ignore the fact that people will always shape their behavior to avoid consequence while looking for ways to serve their interests at the expense of the public good. And then when they do, we often act as if law is itself a kind of natural law, and if we can find no category for the behavior we abhor, that means that we must accept that they have some right to do it, as thought it’s out of our hands.
This situation is a profound demonstration of all of it. South Africa’s system of apartheid is a very useful framework for understanding the systems used to maintain Palestinians as a permanent underclass unable to gain meaningful political agency. This fact – that apartheid is a useful framework for examining the Israeli system and determining what to do about it – is true regardless of whether the system in question fulfills a definition. The definition is supposed to be useful. If you don’t think the term applies, that’s just a reflection that the definition apparently needs to be updated, because the thing the definition describes exists regardless of whether our language presently communicates it.
Language – like law – is a man-made tool that is supposed to serve us, not the other way around.
I actually think that all makes sense.
I will acknowledge that when I describe the Israeli system as Apartheid, I’m using it in a colloquial sense, not a legal sense. Which I think is appropriate, because my purpose is to characterize the severity and urgency of the situation rather than prosecute the case in international court. But I can accept that it might fall short based on legal definitions (in part because Israel is familiar enough with international law that they usually take care in developing policy to try to avoid when possible making their violations easy to prosecute).
I think if that’s the framework you’re applying, you might be interested in this law review (assuming you haven’t already read it): “The Ongoing Nakba: Towards a Legal Framework for Palestine,” by Rabea Eghbariah
It’s a bit long, but the feature I think is useful is summed up here:
The thesis, at least in my understanding, is that the situation is unique enough to fit poorly into the major categories we use for describing atrocities, and that it requires that we recognize it as the primary case for a novel form of ethnic oppression that incorporates elements of genocide and apartheid, but operates in a way that is ultimately unique to the specifics of this situation. I’m curious what you might think of that argument.
You should use it in the legal sense :)
Honestly, I have a bone to pick with legal language.
I think it puts the cart before the horse. Law as a concept is an incredible invention, but I think we in our present often forget that it IS an invention: it’s a technology that was developed to systematize our ability to limit and remedy harm.
However we frequently ignore the fact that people will always shape their behavior to avoid consequence while looking for ways to serve their interests at the expense of the public good. And then when they do, we often act as if law is itself a kind of natural law, and if we can find no category for the behavior we abhor, that means that we must accept that they have some right to do it, as thought it’s out of our hands.
This situation is a profound demonstration of all of it. South Africa’s system of apartheid is a very useful framework for understanding the systems used to maintain Palestinians as a permanent underclass unable to gain meaningful political agency. This fact – that apartheid is a useful framework for examining the Israeli system and determining what to do about it – is true regardless of whether the system in question fulfills a definition. The definition is supposed to be useful. If you don’t think the term applies, that’s just a reflection that the definition apparently needs to be updated, because the thing the definition describes exists regardless of whether our language presently communicates it.
Language – like law – is a man-made tool that is supposed to serve us, not the other way around.