We knew about piss poor encryption a long time ago, every modern algorithm is quantum proof. That includes AES, Kerberos and even 3GPP encryption used in mobile networks. So unless you’re using old crap, you’re safe even if quantum computers will become powerful tomorrow.
No? Shor’s algorithm breaks RSA and literally anything elliptic curve-based, which covers all conventional asymmetric algorithms. Symmetric algorithms like you listed aren’t effected, but are useless for communication unless you have an asymmetric algorithm or, like, a physical carrier pigeon to share a secret beforehand.
This is why NIST is currently finalising several post-quantum standards. Which work, but don’t do anything fancy, and have comparatively gigantic primitives you have to send back and forth - i.e. are worse.
Yeah, and they all bootstrap using things like Diffie-Hellman, and intrinsically must. Which are broken by Shor’s algorithm. For example, a TLS connection could use TLS_ECDHE to share a secret and generate a temporary one-time secret, and then move to an AES stream based on that shared secret for the actual data. If a quantum attacker broke that first step, they could read the AES-encrypted data no problem, because they would also have the one-time secret.
Do you have some choice insults for NIST as well? They’re putting a lot of effort into things like Kyber, but maybe they don’t understand cryptographic protocols as well as you do.
We knew about piss poor encryption a long time ago, every modern algorithm is quantum proof. That includes AES, Kerberos and even 3GPP encryption used in mobile networks. So unless you’re using old crap, you’re safe even if quantum computers will become powerful tomorrow.
No? Shor’s algorithm breaks RSA and literally anything elliptic curve-based, which covers all conventional asymmetric algorithms. Symmetric algorithms like you listed aren’t effected, but are useless for communication unless you have an asymmetric algorithm or, like, a physical carrier pigeon to share a secret beforehand.
This is why NIST is currently finalising several post-quantum standards. Which work, but don’t do anything fancy, and have comparatively gigantic primitives you have to send back and forth - i.e. are worse.
What do you mean by useless? These are standard algorithms used everywhere. Get your head out of the sand.
Yeah, and they all bootstrap using things like Diffie-Hellman, and intrinsically must. Which are broken by Shor’s algorithm. For example, a TLS connection could use TLS_ECDHE to share a secret and generate a temporary one-time secret, and then move to an AES stream based on that shared secret for the actual data. If a quantum attacker broke that first step, they could read the AES-encrypted data no problem, because they would also have the one-time secret.
Do you have some choice insults for NIST as well? They’re putting a lot of effort into things like Kyber, but maybe they don’t understand cryptographic protocols as well as you do.