Patrick Breyer (@[email protected])
digitalcourage.social
Angehängt: 1 Bild 🇬🇧Leak on latest #ChatControl attempt (in German): https://netzpolitik.org/2024/interne-dokumente-sperrminoritaet-gegen-chatkontrolle-wackelt/ +++ Only AUT, DEU, EST, LUX, POL, SVN were critical – no blocking minority! +++ BEL, CZE, FIN, ITA, NLD, PRT, SWE undecided +++ EU legal experts confirm violation of our fundamental rights +++ Only 5 days to next discussion +++ Help pressure our governments into defending our #privacy of correspondence and secure #encryption now: https://www.patrick-breyer.de/en/take-action-to-stop-chat-control-now/

Leak on latest #ChatControl attempt (in German): https://netzpolitik.org/2024/interne-dokumente-sperrminoritaet-gegen-chatkontrolle-wackelt/ +++ Only AUT, DEU, EST, LUX, POL, SVN were critical – no blocking minority! +++ BEL, CZE, FIN, ITA, NLD, PRT, SWE undecided +++ EU legal experts confirm violation of our fundamental rights +++ Only 5 days to next discussion +++

Help pressure our governments into defending our #privacy of correspondence and secure #encryption now: https://www.patrick-breyer.de/en/take-action-to-stop-chat-control-now/

    • @piyuv
      2•3 months ago

      The last link in the post explains it well

        • @piyuv
          7•3 months ago

          https://www.patrick-breyer.de/en/take-action-to-stop-chat-control-now/

          It works well for me. But let me paste it here anyway:

          Chat control is back on the agenda of EU governments. EU governments are to express their position on the latest proposal on 23 September. EU Ministers of the Interior are to adopt the proposal on 10/11 October. Latest update of 12 September…

          In June we managed to stop the unprecedented plan by an extremely narrow “blocking minority” of EU governments: Chat control proponents achieved 63.7% of the 65% of votes threshold required in the Council of the EU for a qualified majority.

          Several formerly opposed governments such as France have already given up their opposition. Several still critical governments are only asking for small modifications (e.g. searching for “known content” only or excluding end-to-end encryption) which would still result in mass searches and leaks of our private communications. Therefore there is a real threat that the required majority for mass scanning of private communications may be achieved at any time under the current Hungarian presidency (Hungary being a supporter of the proposal).

          That is why we now need to get involved and raise our voices to our governments and raise awareness in the wider population.
          → Previously supportive governments must be convinced to change their minds
          → Critical governments need to be pushed to demand comprehensive changes, as proposed by the European Parliament, and not just minor changes to the proposal.

          In the absence of such fundamental revision, the proposal should be rejected altogether.