There is not requirement in the bill to prevent users in specific age brackets from accessing certain content or applications.
It simply defines that a method for age attestation (not verification) must exist and that the age bracket data be made available to apps and appstores.
The people who decide what age brackets can access would be the appstores and the developers.
I will concede that using the word “controls” for the OS provider could be misunderstood. What I would assume is that they are meaning control as in the person/entity that provides updates for the system. Ie, MS, Apple, Linux Foundation, Canonical, etc.
Does it even allow for user privacy protection? Nothing I’ve read of the bill suggests that an app could ask whether the user is of a fuckable class by its Epstein-list owners, and allow the user to block the prompt. Every other app has to ask for permission to use the camera, to write to certain directories, they can even be firewalled to prevent network access. The very idea that an OS must code in a form of user information that must be provided to any app, trusted or not, is a warped, Palantir-driven approach to (in)security.
Sorry it is really hard to understand what you are arguing here.
If you don’t want your info (whether you are an adult a teen or a child) to be shared with “owners of apps that are on the Epstein list”, then don’t install those apps. There is nothing in this law requiring you to download any particular app.
If an app were sending this data to a third party, like palantir, then they would be in direct violation of this law.
If you were expecting to be able to leave decisions about your personal privacy and security to any governing body then you are in for a sore awakening. You should be well aware of how privacy and security are things that we have to take personal responsibility for.
If you don’t want your info (whether you are an adult a teen or a child) to be shared with “owners of apps that are on the Epstein list”, then don’t install those apps. There is nothing in this law requiring you to download any particular app.
Linux, as well as any decent system of security, operates via varying levels of trust. If I install a game on Steam, that does not get root access with permission to rewrite my kernel. Similarly, if I have banking info on my device, it doesn’t get to view that, or anything with my face or name. You can install and even run something without trusting it with your life.
If an app were sending this data to a third party, like palantir, then they would be in direct violation of this law.
We have seen time and time again that courts do not provide adequate protections for these types of data breaches. The law does not matter. At the most, software companies get slapped on the wrist, but more likely they get away with it, as “programming is hard, and it’s easier to just send everything”. It is far, far easier to assert that a malicious app is not submitting marketing, or “fuckability” information on your child if that device does not denote itself as a child’s device in the first place. That’s only possible if the law isn’t hammering the OS into openly exposing its own user data to anyone that asks for it.
Your last point about personal responsibility is an important one. It’s why, if you happen to be using an old insecure device running Windows XP, you can toy around on the web with it, but you should disconnect it from your personal network, and should not enter personal info on it. Any device software that is forced to keep an open “Would_President_47_Seek_To_Rape_This_User” flag, available to every application, is removing that option for personal responsibility.
There is not requirement in the bill to prevent users in specific age brackets from accessing certain content or applications.
It simply defines that a method for age attestation (not verification) must exist and that the age bracket data be made available to apps and appstores.
The people who decide what age brackets can access would be the appstores and the developers.
I will concede that using the word “controls” for the OS provider could be misunderstood. What I would assume is that they are meaning control as in the person/entity that provides updates for the system. Ie, MS, Apple, Linux Foundation, Canonical, etc.
Does it even allow for user privacy protection? Nothing I’ve read of the bill suggests that an app could ask whether the user is of a fuckable class by its Epstein-list owners, and allow the user to block the prompt. Every other app has to ask for permission to use the camera, to write to certain directories, they can even be firewalled to prevent network access. The very idea that an OS must code in a form of user information that must be provided to any app, trusted or not, is a warped, Palantir-driven approach to (in)security.
Sorry it is really hard to understand what you are arguing here.
If you don’t want your info (whether you are an adult a teen or a child) to be shared with “owners of apps that are on the Epstein list”, then don’t install those apps. There is nothing in this law requiring you to download any particular app.
If an app were sending this data to a third party, like palantir, then they would be in direct violation of this law.
If you were expecting to be able to leave decisions about your personal privacy and security to any governing body then you are in for a sore awakening. You should be well aware of how privacy and security are things that we have to take personal responsibility for.
Linux, as well as any decent system of security, operates via varying levels of trust. If I install a game on Steam, that does not get root access with permission to rewrite my kernel. Similarly, if I have banking info on my device, it doesn’t get to view that, or anything with my face or name. You can install and even run something without trusting it with your life.
We have seen time and time again that courts do not provide adequate protections for these types of data breaches. The law does not matter. At the most, software companies get slapped on the wrist, but more likely they get away with it, as “programming is hard, and it’s easier to just send everything”. It is far, far easier to assert that a malicious app is not submitting marketing, or “fuckability” information on your child if that device does not denote itself as a child’s device in the first place. That’s only possible if the law isn’t hammering the OS into openly exposing its own user data to anyone that asks for it.
Your last point about personal responsibility is an important one. It’s why, if you happen to be using an old insecure device running Windows XP, you can toy around on the web with it, but you should disconnect it from your personal network, and should not enter personal info on it. Any device software that is forced to keep an open “Would_President_47_Seek_To_Rape_This_User” flag, available to every application, is removing that option for personal responsibility.