It depends if the swapped mind considered themselves me or not (clone’s brain?). If not then perceived identity would follow the mind, even if the legal identity didn’t.
If it were a clone’s mind, we would have to come to some sort of understanding on the subject.
It can quickly get convoluted. E.g. if I became a digital identity, would I be willing to split off versions of myself for particular tasks, only to absorb them later. Conversely, could I function as such an entity? How long would I need to diverge before I became a truly separate entity in my own mind?
The book “Accelerando”, by Charles Stross plays with this. He refers to them as eigen-minds. A collection of minds overlapping within a single identity. How liable is a diverged eigen-mind from its alternates, when it comes to contracts and debts?
Body swap would be continuity of memory, but not identity or material.
It depends if the swapped mind considered themselves me or not (clone’s brain?). If not then perceived identity would follow the mind, even if the legal identity didn’t.
If it were a clone’s mind, we would have to come to some sort of understanding on the subject.
It can quickly get convoluted. E.g. if I became a digital identity, would I be willing to split off versions of myself for particular tasks, only to absorb them later. Conversely, could I function as such an entity? How long would I need to diverge before I became a truly separate entity in my own mind?
The book “Accelerando”, by Charles Stross plays with this. He refers to them as eigen-minds. A collection of minds overlapping within a single identity. How liable is a diverged eigen-mind from its alternates, when it comes to contracts and debts?