This can be an effective method for breaking persistence, but it is important to note that a tracker may be able to determine that a randomization tool is being used, which can itself be a fingerprinting characteristic. Careful thought has to go into how randomizing fingerprinting characteristics will or will not be effective in combating trackers.
In practice, the most realistic protection currently available is the Tor Browser, which has put a lot of effort into reducing browser fingerprintability. For day-to-day use, the best options are to run tools like Privacy Badger or Disconnect that will block some (but unfortunately not all) of the domains that try to perform fingerprinting, and/or to use a tool like NoScript( for Firefox), which greatly reduces the amount of data available to fingerprinters.
So the EFF seem to recommend generic over randomisation…
Maybe ask yourself why the Tor project decided against randomisation?
Yes it is, and that’s why the EFF recommends it.
Where do the EFF recommend randomisation? From the EFF’s surveillance self defence course.
They don’t directly recommend either… But then on https://coveryourtracks.eff.org/learn
So the EFF seem to recommend generic over randomisation…
Maybe ask yourself why the Tor project decided against randomisation?