Council on Foreign RelationsWashington, D.C. MR. SULLIVAN: At least I had the bravery to give that speech at Brookings rather than at CFR. So — (laughter) — Mike, I want to say thank you for having me back at CFR. And to Susan and Kurt and Charlene and Steve, thank you for having me back…
Just a few weeks ago, Taiwan held historic elections without any major cross-Strait incident, in part because all sides — Washington, Beijing, and Taipei — worked to reduce miscommunication and misperception about their respective intentions. That is an outcome few may have foreseen in August of 2022, when most expected the cross-Strait situation to grow more tense, not less. But it’s no guarantee of future trends, and the risk remains real.
This approach has been the hallmark of Biden’s foreign policy. They’re working behind the scenes subtly and competently, making progress in ways that doesn’t really track with the 24-hour news cycle and clickbait journalism. It’s good to see the efforts paying off, but they really, REALLY need to work on their messaging.
Beijing has never cared much about the result of this Taiwanese election because the majority of Taiwanese support improving relations with China (see: votes for KMT, TPP). This entire claim of “tense cross-Strait relations” is a manufactured concern so Biden can knock a win.
The most significant recent tension in cross-Strait relations has been the declaration of the Taiwan Strait as international waters (induced largely by FONOPS declaring it as such) and the ending of some of Taiwan’s special economic statuses for trade with China (induced largely by increased arms trade with foreign powers). Everything else is just posturing to save face on both sides.
That’s nonsense, even if you pretend Taiwan is a part of China, which is clearly nothing more than a useful fiction for all parties, there is a space even at the narrowest point of the straight that is just EEZ. Which is a region that is free to navigate but the host country has exclusive rights to minerals, fishing etc within that region.
This is just strictly not true, otherwise Canada’s Northwest Passage would be considered EEZ and not part of internal waters. EEZ is drawn from the extant point outside of the baseline.
This approach has been the hallmark of Biden’s foreign policy. They’re working behind the scenes subtly and competently, making progress in ways that doesn’t really track with the 24-hour news cycle and clickbait journalism. It’s good to see the efforts paying off, but they really, REALLY need to work on their messaging.
Beijing has never cared much about the result of this Taiwanese election because the majority of Taiwanese support improving relations with China (see: votes for KMT, TPP). This entire claim of “tense cross-Strait relations” is a manufactured concern so Biden can knock a win.
The most significant recent tension in cross-Strait relations has been the declaration of the Taiwan Strait as international waters (induced largely by FONOPS declaring it as such) and the ending of some of Taiwan’s special economic statuses for trade with China (induced largely by increased arms trade with foreign powers). Everything else is just posturing to save face on both sides.
That’s nonsense, even if you pretend Taiwan is a part of China, which is clearly nothing more than a useful fiction for all parties, there is a space even at the narrowest point of the straight that is just EEZ. Which is a region that is free to navigate but the host country has exclusive rights to minerals, fishing etc within that region.
This is just strictly not true, otherwise Canada’s Northwest Passage would be considered EEZ and not part of internal waters. EEZ is drawn from the extant point outside of the baseline.