- cross-posted to:
- [email protected]
- cross-posted to:
- [email protected]
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If I understand correctly, stream isolation will route different connections through different circuits. If you’re doing two different things of a sensitive nature, open different browsers and applications, use random user-induced delays in your actions/responses and PGP-encrypt everything. And listen to what the TOR project says about the mitigations. I have some reading to do myself I guess
This attack has been known for years now. And tor is simply not able to defend against it without a complete redesign.
The potential for timing attacks has been known since the beginning of Tor. In other words, more than a decade. But that doesn’t mean you can’t defend against it. One way to defend against it is by having more nodes. Another way is to write clients that take into account the potential for timing attacks. Both of these were specifically mentioned in the article.
Based on what was in the article and what’s in the history books, I’m not sure how to interpret your comment in a constructive way. Is there anything more specific you meant, that isn’t contradicted by what’s in the article?
Redesign being I2P
What else you going to use?
I wish more people would try out I2P as a result. AFAIK, garlic routing makes this kind of attack impossible.
Insane 2lown Posse?
AFAIK it only makes it harder not impossible.
