This is an unpopular opinion, and I get why – people crave a scapegoat. CrowdStrike undeniably pushed a faulty update demanding a low-level fix (booting into recovery). However, this incident lays bare the fragility of corporate IT, particularly for companies entrusted with vast amounts of sensitive personal information.
Robust disaster recovery plans, including automated processes to remotely reboot and remediate thousands of machines, aren’t revolutionary. They’re basic hygiene, especially when considering the potential consequences of a breach. Yet, this incident highlights a systemic failure across many organizations. While CrowdStrike erred, the real culprit is a culture of shortcuts and misplaced priorities within corporate IT.
Too often, companies throw millions at vendor contracts, lured by flashy promises and neglecting the due diligence necessary to ensure those solutions truly fit their needs. This is exacerbated by a corporate culture where CEOs, vice presidents, and managers are often more easily swayed by vendor kickbacks, gifts, and lavish trips than by investing in innovative ideas with measurable outcomes.
This misguided approach not only results in bloated IT budgets but also leaves companies vulnerable to precisely the kind of disruptions caused by the CrowdStrike incident. When decision-makers prioritize personal gain over the long-term health and security of their IT infrastructure, it’s ultimately the customers and their data that suffer.
Worked many high-level corp IT. Problem is them, not CrowdStrike.
Thanks for responding in good faith!
I agree that while CS did screw up in pushing out a bad update, only having a single vendor for a critical process that can take the whole business down is equally a screw up. Ideally companies should have had CS installed on half the systems and a secondary malware prevention system on every DR and “redundant” system. Having all of a company’s eggs in a single basket is very bad.
All the above being said; to properly implement a fully redundant, to the vendor level, system would require either double the support team, or a massive development effort to tie the management of the systems together. Either way, that is going to be very expensive. The point being: Reducing the budget of IT departments will further cause the consolidation of vendors and increase the number of vendor caused complete outage events.