There’s this thought experiment: think about delayed “scrapping” in the sender. Let’s say by a minute? You’d have time to talk to yourself over a video call, then what are you going to think about “it’s still me” when your copy walks away and you are about to be zapped?
Isn’t there a variation of this with an evil shapeshifter captain Kirk fighting real Kirk, where the real Kirk eventually tells Spock to “shoot both of us” and then Spock shoots the other, saying “this is how I knew it was you”?
They both have their own sense of self. By the time they fork, they’re no longer the same individual (but very similar) and it doesn’t matter which one gets destroyed: the bad part is the loss of the last copy of a personality, not a copy.
explain that first bit to the person I was replying to, not me :)
that’s a very utilitarian approach. Which, I am sure, would be very comforting to the copy about to be destroyed. Also, by that logic you could kill twins/triplets at birth, all but the “last copy”. Very dark, very cynical.
There’s this thought experiment: think about delayed “scrapping” in the sender. Let’s say by a minute? You’d have time to talk to yourself over a video call, then what are you going to think about “it’s still me” when your copy walks away and you are about to be zapped?
Knowing humans, each one would think “Wait, you’re zapping the wrong one!”
Isn’t there a variation of this with an evil shapeshifter captain Kirk fighting real Kirk, where the real Kirk eventually tells Spock to “shoot both of us” and then Spock shoots the other, saying “this is how I knew it was you”?
I mean, there’s the goatee universe, but that’s different.
It’s a persistent sense of self and there’s no pain or anything, so fine.
What if the original version of you did suffer?
Sucks to be them I guess, but they’re not me anymore.
Then that’s entirely different, and I would wonder why the technology was developed at all!
I think you missed the point of the thought experiment. How can you have a persistent sense of self with two bodies in remote locations?
They both have their own sense of self. By the time they fork, they’re no longer the same individual (but very similar) and it doesn’t matter which one gets destroyed: the bad part is the loss of the last copy of a personality, not a copy.
I wrote about this topic! And I don’t think my outlook is dark; I just think you’re wrong about “continuity” playing any role at all!
https://phil.red/blog/2025/9/5/identity-illusion